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Symposium
Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry
John R. Allison,* Abe Dunn** & Ronald J. Mann***
I.

Introduction

Software patents have been controversial since the days when
“software” referred to the crude programs that came free with an IBM
mainframe.
Different perspectives have been presented in judicial,
legislative, and administrative fora over the years, and the press has paid as
much attention to this issue as it has to any other intellectual property topic
during this time. Meanwhile, a software industry developed and has grown
to a remarkable size, whether measured by revenues or profitability, number
of firms or employees, or research expenditures. The scope of software innovation has become even broader, as an increasing number of devices
incorporate information technology, requiring modern manufacturing firms
outside the software industry to employ developers and programmers to ensure that increasingly diverse functions are performed more efficiently.
Although inventors have consistently asserted their need for patents in
order to compete with industry incumbents, patent protection has not been
easily or consistently available for much of this period. Rather, the legal
system has responded gradually to the burgeoning software industry by
broadening the scope and strength of protection for software-related inventions in fits and starts. The explosive growth of the industry is largely
attributable to demand generated by the efficiency of software solutions; the
expansion of the venture capital industry over the same period largely

* Spence Centennial Professor of Business Administration, McCombs School of Business,
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** Economist, U.S. Department of Justice.
*** Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law and Co-Director,
Center for Law, Business, and Economics, University of Texas School of Law. We thank for
comments Rosemarie Ziedonis as well as participants at the Frontiers of Intellectual Property
Conference. The views expressed are not those of the U.S. Department of Justice. © 2007 John R.
Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann.
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explains the lack of industry concentration.1 The “garage” mentality can be
explained by the fact that even some of the largest industry incumbents began with one or two (largely unfunded) inventors. Also, there is every reason
to believe that increased patent protection has contributed to the ability of
independent inventors and smaller firms to compete.2
Moreover, the ability to obtain patents on software always has been
important to some of the industry incumbents, while others have exhibited
little need for patents and displayed, in some cases, strenuous opposition to
the patentability of software. The incumbents are a diverse group. Some
produce only software; others have substantial hardware product lines. Some
sell to other technology firms and others sell applications to end users in a
broad range of markets. And some sell prepackaged software products,
while others focus on services—custom programming, installation, or
maintenance. Regardless of the sector in which they participate, the
incumbents spend massive amounts on research and development (R&D)—
about 14% of their annual revenues, more than $60,000 per employee.3
However, there are important patterns in patenting practices that raw data on
R&D investments cannot explain.
This Article examines the relation between patents and the different
business models used by firms in the software industry. The analysis has
four parts. Part II provides a brief retrospective on software patents,
emphasizing the shifting role of patents as the industry grew into its modern
form. Part III uses quantitative data about patent portfolios to discuss the
role that patents play for incumbent firms in the modern era. We highlight
the fact that business models explain much of the pattern of patenting
practices. Part IV describes the use of patents in the three channels through
which technology flows into incumbent firms—venture-backed firms, opensource developers, and independent inventors—all of which contribute to the
development of technologies that might supplant or improve the products and
services currently delivered by incumbent firms. Finally, Part V concludes
with a brief discussion of present-day industry perspectives on software
patenting. As incumbents are now leading the charge on patent reform on all
fronts,4 we can expect that some change will occur. An understanding of the

1. The number of venture capital investments in software firms increased rapidly during this
period, from 11 in 1979, to 188 in 1989, to 1,035 in 1999. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N,
YEARBOOK 48 (2004).
2. The question of incentives is more difficult, given the important roles played both by young
entrepreneurs who have earned millions or even billions of dollars in this industry and by opensource developers driven, at least in part, by altruistic motives.
3. Corporate R&D Scorecard, TECH. REV., Sept. 2005, at 56, 57, available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articlefiles/2005_rd_scorecard.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation
Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (May 23, 2006) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) (“[O]ur patent litigation system is broken.”), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1911&wit_id=5366; Brief of the Business Software
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varying uses to which software firms put patents in their businesses provides
a useful perspective on the types of reforms they advocate.
II.

The Rise of Software Patents

A. Background
Patent debates often focus on the statements and positions taken by
noted industry participants.5 Thus, it is common to hear that “even IBM once
Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing on behalf of leading software and hardware companies against
the Federal Circuit’s standard for determining nonobviousness and in favor of a less restrictive
standard); Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in Support of Neither
Party at 5–6, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350) [hereinafter Brief of IBM in KSR] (arguing
against the Federal Circuit’s standard for determining nonobviousness as overly restrictive and in
favor of a rebuttable presumption that skilled artisans will combine elements found in references
within “analogous art”); Brief of Business Software Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 1–3, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130)
[hereinafter Brief of Business Software Alliance in eBay] (arguing on behalf of leading software,
hardware, digital-content, and information-technology products and services companies against the
Federal Circuit’s mandatory injunction standard and in favor of the traditional equitable principles
governing injunctive relief); Brief of International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 2, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of IBM in
eBay] (arguing against the Federal Circuit’s mandatory injunction standard and in favor of
traditional equitable principles governing injunctive relief); The Peer to Patent Project: Community
Patent Review, http://www.communitypatent.org (describing the community patent review initiative
sponsored by IBM and other incumbents).
5. Surely the most discussed statements come from the 1994 hearings of the U.S. Trademark
and Patent Office (PTO) on the propriety of software patents, where trenchant criticisms of software
patents were made. Thus the principal scientist at Adobe Systems, Inc. testified unequivocally: “I
believe that software per se should not be allowed patent protection. . . . I argue that software
should not be patented, not because it is difficult to do so, but because it is wrong to do so.” Public
Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions: Before Bruce A.
Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office 16 (Jan. 26–27, 1994) (statement of Douglas Brotz, Principle
Scientist, Adobe Systems, Inc.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/
software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf. A witness for Autodesk, Inc. contended that “[t]here is absolutely no
evidence whatsoever, not a single iota, that software patents have promoted or will promote
progress.” Id. at 48 (statement of Jim Warren, Member of the Board of Directors, Autodesk, Inc.).
Oracle’s senior vice president expressed a similar view. See id. at 23 (statement of Jerry Baker,
Senior Vice President, Oracle Corp.) (“I cannot find any evidence that patents for software will tend
to [promote the progress of science and useful arts]. [I]ndeed, every indication is to the contrary.”).
On the other hand, major trade groups and software firms testifying at the same hearings expressed
strongly held views that patent protection was important. So, for example, representatives of Apple
and the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturing Association, id. at 8–10 (statement of
Richard LeFaivre, Vice President of Advanced Technology, Apple Computer, and Computer and
Business Equipment Manufacturing Association), of IBM, id. at 78–79 (statement of Victor Siber,
Senior Corporate Counsel, IBM Corp.), of Microsoft, id. at 66 (statement of William Neukom, Vice
President of Law and Corporate Affairs, Microsoft Corp.), and of the Business Software Alliance,
Public Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions: Before Bruce
A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office 18 (Feb. 10–11, 1994) (statement of Dianne Callan, Deputy General
Counsel, Lotus Development Corp.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/
hearings/software/arlington/vahrng.pdf, all provided testimony supporting the patentability of
software. Microsoft’s adherence to this position is notable in light of the $120 million verdict
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was opposed to patents,” or “Microsoft did fine without patents,” or even
“we wouldn’t have Word, Excel, or PowerPoint if earlier inventors had been
able to acquire patent protection.” There is a similar focus on market
responses. Thus prominent academics point to the limits on patent protection
available to the software industry in its earliest days as evidence that software could succeed in the market without patent protection.6 Of course, what
we also see is that software patents did become important, largely because of
market pressures. All of this raises the question whether the software
industry would be more competitive or innovative in a “natural state,” that is,
without patent protection.7

entered against it a few days earlier in Stac Electronics v. Microsoft Corp., 38 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir.
1994). See Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft Loses Case on Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at D1
(discussing the verdict in favor of Stac Electronics in a patent-infringement suit alleging that
Microsoft had appropriated Stac’s data-compression technology).
6. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1143 (1990)
(“Thus, let us accept as a working assumption that the computer software industry has become a
major industry without the aid of patents, and that had patents been in place in the industry’s
infancy, the field would not have grown as it has.”). Surveys of individual software engineers in the
late 1980s suggest that this perspective was widespread among engineers at that time. See Pamela
Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Comparing the Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers on
the Software Copyright “Look and Feel” Lawsuits, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 135 (1989) (finding
opposition to patent protection for various aspects of computer programs, including algorithms); see
also Samuelson, supra, at 1031–32 (“If the software industry neither wants nor needs the patent
system in order to be a vital and innovative industry, then, as a matter of public policy, it is sensible
not to use the patent system for the protection of program-related innovations.”).
7. For example, in an article in PC Magazine, the columnist John Dvorak argued that software
patenting is even bad for Microsoft. John C. Dvorak, Software Patents: Microsoft’s Fatal Error,
PCMAG.COM, Apr. 6, 2005, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1781181,00.asp. Still, recent
scholarship strongly suggests that software patents have private value to the firms that obtain them.
See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Startups, 36 RES.
POL’Y 193, 205–07 (2007) (presenting data indicating that patenting is related to the progress of
venture-backed software firms); John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 30–32, on file with
authors) (finding, among other things, that software patents have significantly more total prior art
references, nonpatent prior art references, forward citations, total claims, and independent claims
than nonsoftware patents issued to the same group of firms in the software industry); Iain M.
Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the Software Industry 33 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12563, 2006) (finding that firms holding software
patents associated with a particular market are more likely to enter and less likely to exit that
market); Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents 31 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12195, 2006) (concluding that “the market evaluated
software patents as unimportant ex ante” but ex post “firms in the ICT section that hold software
patents are . . . valued at a significant premium relative to firms without software patents”); Michael
Noel & Mark Schankerman, Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation 4–5 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research, Discussion Paper No. 5701, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922111
(concluding in an empirical study of the effect of software patents on R&D and market value in the
software industry that there are large positive technology spillovers from software R&D, but that
patenting by rivals reduces R&D investment, patenting rates, and market value, as well as finding a
substantial patent premium in the market valuations of software firms); Robert P. Merges, Patents,
Entry and Growth in the Software Industry (Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=926204 (debunking the portfolio thesis by showing that patent effort by
incumbent firms correlates closely with indicators of market success).
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Turning to the present, the narratives are more organized in some
respects,8 but less predictable in others.9 There is also the question of why
technology firms have such divergent reactions to software patents,
compared to say the pharmaceutical industry where there is a dominant
consensus that vigorous patent enforcement is the best policy. Our discussion suggests a simple explanation for the different perspectives: firms in the
industry generally have supported software patents when it would be helpful
to their competitive position.10 The divergent perspectives simply reflect
divergent uses of patents for particular firms.
B. The Early Days: From Goetz to Diehr
In reality, software patenting predates the controversies of the 1990s
and, indeed, predates the software industry itself. Thus, although it might be
a stretch to credit Samuel Morse with the first software patent,11 it is plain
that Bell Labs received an important software patent in 1951 for its “ErrorDetecting and Correcting System.”12 Within the modern software industry,

8. The most significant opponents of software patents in the United States are Richard Stallman
and the Free Software Foundation. The Free Software Foundation often participates as an amicus in
patent cases, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Petitioner, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), and also presents testimony in congressional
hearings, see, e.g., The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 15–22 (2003) (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School, and member of the Free Software Foundation Board of Directors). See also Free
Software Foundation, Opinion on Patent Retaliation, http://gplv3.fsf.org/patent-dd2.html (last
modified Aug. 3, 2006) (explaining changes to the new GPLv3 that target patent “aggression” by
server operators who sue others for patent infringement for using and sharing improved versions of
programs covered by the GPL). That perspective is more widely held in the European Union and
elsewhere outside the United States, see, e.g., FLORIAN MUELLER, NO LOBBYISTS AS SUCH: THE
WAR OVER SOFTWARE PATENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Wendy M. Grossman ed., version 1.03
2006), http://www.no-lobbyists-as-such.com/NoLobbyistsAsSuch.pdf, where the opposition to
software patents is bound up with balance-of-trade concerns. In the European Union, for example,
protection of software patents is generally regarded as transferring power and wealth from fledgling
European firms to existing U.S. incumbent firms. See, e.g., Press Release, Foundation for a Free
Information Infrastructure, Single EU Patent Law Good for US Giants, Bad for Small EU Firms
(Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/Single_EU_patent_law_good_for_
US_giants%2C_bad_for_small_EU_firms (describing opposition to a European Union-wide patent
law by a European nonprofit representing more than 3,000 smaller information-technology firms on
the grounds that it would benefit large U.S. companies at the expense of small European firms).
9. As discussed below, incumbent firms have widely varying patenting strategies, which have
led to different positions on important policy issues.
10. Despite high-profile cases requiring changes to Office, Windows, and Internet Explorer,
Microsoft executives continue to extol the virtues of software patents. See Bradford L. Smith &
Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An
Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 256–58 (2004) (listing reasons why patent
protection is superior to copyright in an article coauthored by two Microsoft executives).
11. See GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS § 5.10[E][1], at 50, 53 (2d ed. cum. supp.
2006) (characterizing Morse’s famous telegraph patent of the 1840s as a precursor to modern
software patents).
12. U.S. Patent No. 2,552,629 (issued May 15, 1951).
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Martin Goetz’s 1968 patent often is regarded as the first “true” software
patent.13 As Goetz’s memoirs explain, the ability to patent his software was
central to his firm’s competitive position.14 Because Goetz was working at a
period when IBM still bundled software with hardware—so that the software
was effectively free if purchased from IBM—the only way of staking out a
competitive foothold would be to prevent IBM from copying his product.15
A patent was the only apparent technique by which Goetz could obtain
protection.16 And those who have studied the market have concluded that the
patent served its function well because its disclosure was so thorough that it
gave competitors who had read the patent practical access to the
technology.17
IBM recognized the difficulty of obtaining intellectual property (IP)
protection for software, though its market position gave it a somewhat
different perspective. It opposed unbundling its software because of
“[IBM’s] present inability to protect the proprietary use of [its] programming
systems. . . . [The Company] must settle on whether or not, and to what
degree, [it] can protect programs before [it] can deal adequately with the
question of selling them.”18 As long as its software was bundled, IBM regularly took the position that patent protection for software was inappropriate.19
The parallel to IBM’s modern involvement with Linux is startling—a market
strategy in which IBM would profit from the sales of proprietary hardware in
a value chain joined with free software.20
Unfortunately for IBM’s competitors, the industry’s efforts to clarify the
scope of patent protection during the 1970s were generally not fruitful. As
the decade began, the case for software patenting was a strong one, based on
the 1969 decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re
13. See First Patent Is Issued for Software, Full Implications Are Not Yet Known,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 19, 1968, at 1, reprinted in Martin Goetz, Memoirs of a Software Pioneer:
Part 1, IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, Jan.–Mar. 2002, at 43, 51 (discussing U.S. Patent No.
3,380,029 (filed Apr. 8, 1965) (issued Apr. 28, 1968)).
14. See Goetz, supra note 13, at 49 (discussing the realization that patenting and copyrighting
software would be essential to Applied Data Research’s survival).
15. Id. at 50–53.
16. Id.
17. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software Patents,
11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 214–15 (2005) (discussing Applied Data Research’s
patent of Autoflow and the resulting thorough disclosure that allowed competitors to understand
Autoflow and attempt to improve the program).
18. GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS § 1.04[A], at 39 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting
testimony from 1960s IBM antitrust litigation).
19. See U.S. Patent Court to Rehear Software Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1969, at 43
(discussing IBM’s opposition to software patents in proceedings before the PTO, aligned against
Goetz’s employer Applied Data Research); see also Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1143 (noting the
early opposition to software patents by IBM and other leading hardware firms).
20. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still
Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (2006) (discussing IBM’s investment in open-source
software, namely Linux and Apache, and its strategy to profit by offering a value chain that uses
those programs).
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Prater.21 The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Gottschalk v. Benson,22
however, brought Prater into grave doubt by invalidating a patent on an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary
numbers.23
In the Supreme Court, IBM and other large hardware
manufacturers opposed to the patent squared off against trade groups
representing small software firms trying to gain a foothold in the industry.24
Because the patent in question was regarded as weak by firms in the industry,
the victory was not regarded as catastrophic, although it did diminish the enthusiasm for patent filings at the time.25 The 1978 decision in Parker v.
Flook,26 invalidating a method for updating an alarm limit in a chemical
process,27 did not make things any better, though again the narrowness of the
decision left the industry uncertain of the ultimate question of patentability.28
Still, many observers at the time regarded Parker as a major setback.29
Thus, through the 1970s and into the 1980s many firms routinely failed
to patent inventions that readily would have been patented in later decades.
Martin Campbell-Kelly argues forcefully that the lack of clear patent protection had adverse effects on the pace of development.30 Offering an example
regarding the invention of VisiCalc (a prominent early spreadsheet), he
argues that the spreadsheet sector would have developed more rapidly if the
inventor had patented the technology because competitors would have had
access to the patent disclosure as a way to understand the technology instead
of “reinventing the wheel” for themselves.31 Similarly, he contends that the
proliferation of word processors by the early 1980s reflected wasteful

21. 415 F.2d 1393, 1405–06 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that a general-purpose digital computer
programmed to perform certain mathematical operations in spectrographic analysis was patentable
because the computer involved programming and was not obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
22. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
23. Id. at 71–73.
24. See Warren Weaver Jr., High Court Denies Computer Patent for Programing, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1972, at 1.
25. See Martin Goetz, Memoirs of a Software Pioneer: Part 2, IEEE ANNALS HIST.
COMPUTING, Oct.–Dec. 2002, at 14, 18 (suggesting that the patent was “not representative” of
inventions in the industry and “never should have been filed or appealed”). For a close reading of
Benson, arguing that it is much more hostile to software patenting than Goetz suggests, see
Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1048–62.
26. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
27. Id. at 594–96.
28. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 22 (noting the perceived ambiguity of Parker); N.R. Kleinfield,
Software Patent Issue Is Murky, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1978, at D6 (reporting Goetz’s view that
“[n]one of the computer programs that came before the Supreme Court is regarded by the software
industry as a good example of high-level programming”).
29. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Curbs Software Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1978, at D1
(quoting a software-trade-association representative who argued that “the [software] industry . . .
now has no Federal protection against theft by competitors,” which he viewed as a “gigantic
industry problem”); see also Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1076–83 (providing a detailed contextual
analysis of Parker).
30. See Campbell-Kelly, supra note 17, at 198–99.
31. Id.
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“overfishing” that would have been truncated if early innovators had
obtained effective patent protection.32
By the end of the 1970s, IBM’s position had changed. After it unbundled its software from its hardware in 1970, IBM entered the field of
competition in which it had to sell its software products at a separate price
and attempt to defend them from appropriation by competitors.33 Pressure
from newcomers to the industry, particularly those from Japan,34 quickly
turned IBM into an advocate for increased IP protection for software.35 And
with the Court’s 1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr,36 the way seemed open,
though perhaps not yet clear, for regular patenting of the kinds of computer
programs that were at the core of the rapidly growing software industry.37
C. The 1980s: The PC and the First Software Patent Portfolios
The Court’s 1981 decision in Diehr certainly was not the most
important event of the year for the software industry. IBM’s introduction of
the personal computer was much more significant. Although others had sold
personal computers with some success—Apple and Tandy at the time were
regarded as formidable competitors38—the introduction of the IBM Personal
Computer (PC) transformed the software industry.39 For one thing, the
deployment of the IBM PC and the rapid entry of parallel IBM-compatible

32. Id. at 201–02, 209.
33. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 24–25 (discussing IBM’s move to protect its source code in
response to increased competition following the unbundling of IBM software).
34. Japanese software developers benefited from the same government support as competitors
in other industries on which Japan focused. See Steve Lohr, Japan’s Hard Look at Software, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1983, at F4 (“[T]he full arsenal of government and industry backing is being directed
at software development in Japan.”).
35. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 24–28 (discussing IBM’s move to maintain the secrecy of its
source code so that it could use trade-secret protection for the functional ideas carried out by the
code in response to increased competition following the unbundling of IBM software); Angel
Castillo, Bill Safeguards Data Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1980, at D1 (noting IBM’s support
for the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980). IBM’s first major IP claim in the software
industry came at this time when it challenged Hitachi’s incorporation into its software products of
technology it claimed Hitachi had stolen from IBM. Hitachi Disputes Fee to I.B.M., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1983, at D5.
36. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
37. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 22–23 (noting the positive contemporaneous response to
Diehr).
38. Andrew Pollack, Big I.B.M.’s Little Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1981, at D1
(discussing IBM’s entry into the personal computer market—“a market now dominated by Apple
Computer, Inc. and Tandy Corporation’s Radio Shack division”).
39. See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAM ASPRAY, COMPUTER 229 (1997) (stating that
the IBM PC became so popular that most of the major software packages were converted to run on
the machine, which encouraged other manufacturers to produce “clone” machines that ran on the
same software); Pollack, supra note 38, at D1 (noting that the IBM PC was a direct challenge to
Apple and Tandy’s dominance of the market); Andrew Pollack, Next, a Computer on Every Desk,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1981, at F1 (recognizing that IBM’s entry into personal computing would
change the market).
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machines40 fostered a competition for a standard operating system to be used
on those machines, a competition in which Microsoft’s MS-DOS system successfully dislodged the CP/M system developed by then market leader
Digital Research, one of many companies fated to become bywords for a lack
of market foresight in this rapidly developing industry.41 As Figures 1 and 2
display, the need to protect that operating system would make Microsoft one
of the first software-products firms to invest heavily in patents as a way to
protect its core technology.42
The other thing that came from the deployment of the PC was a vast and
previously unimaginable market for software applications to be deployed on
the geometrically increasing number of personal computers in the American
workplace.43 This signaled the end (or at least diminished importance) of the
“garage” era of software development, as the need to produce sophisticated
applications rapidly called into existence a large number of large firms, all of
which began to compete against each other for the attention of the limited
available capital investors.44 Not surprisingly, the fiercely competitive landscape of rapid development against a backdrop of uncertainty in legal rules
led firms to adopt very different IP strategies. Adobe, like Microsoft, began
to patent relatively early, apparently hoping to protect its early lead in the
“Font Wars” of the late 1980s.45

40. See Andrew Pollack, Big I.B.M. Has Done It Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1983, at F1
(discussing the proliferation of IBM clones).
41. A common perspective is that CP/M failed because Digital Research moved too slowly to
upgrade its software to accommodate 16-bit processors, leaving Microsoft’s MS-DOS to gain an
insuperable lead in that market before Digital Research ever entered. See MARTIN CAMPBELLKELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE
INDUSTRY 239 (2003) (noting that the 16-bit version of CP/M was not available until months after
the launch of the IBM PC, giving Microsoft “an insuperable first-mover advantage”); David E.
Sanger, The Big Guys Get into the Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1983, at F11 (calling CP/M the
“industry standard” before it lost ground to Microsoft as a result of not being able to run on 16-bit
architecture).
42. See STOBBS, supra note 18, § 11.01[B], at 525–57 (discussing early Microsoft patents on
technology related to operating systems).
43. See CAMPBELL-KELLY, supra note 41, at 242–64 (describing some of the thousands of
software applications designed for the personal computer in its first ten years); Pollack, supra note
38, at D1 (discussing IBM’s plans to foster widespread development of software for the IBM PC).
44. See Andrew Pollack, Microsoft Has It All—Almost, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1985, at D1
(discussing the market forces leading to the professionalization of software development); Andrew
Pollack, Slugging It Out on the Software Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1983, at F1 (describing the
end of the “cottage era” in software development and the beginning of the era of big software
companies and correspondingly large investments).
45. See Peter H. Lewis, The Fallout from the Font Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, at F13
(noting that if Adobe had been willing to share its proprietary information earlier, it probably could
have avoided the “font wars”); Andrew Pollack, Adobe Is Set to Disclose Technology, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1989, at D1 (describing Adobe’s plan to reveal its font technology in an effort to stay
competitive with a joint Apple and Microsoft font project).
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Figure 1: Patent Applications46 per Billion Dollars in Sales
(Prepackaged Software) (1985–2001)

Figure 2: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in R&D
(Prepackaged Software) (1985–2001)

46. Throughout this Article, the tables and figures attribute applications to the year in which
they were filed and refer only to patent applications that resulted in issued patents.
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For the most part, however, products firms47 during the 1980s eschewed
patent protection, apparently accepting the predictions of the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)like pundits advising that copyright law would provide adequate protection.
Thus, Figures 1 and 2 group together under the title of “Late Patentees”
Autodesk, Computer Associates, and Oracle (the three leading products firms
of the time that have survived and have substantial patent portfolios today).
Two obvious factors can explain the change of strategy. The first would be
the belated discovery48 (as the patent applications filed in the 1980s matured
into issued patents) that some of their competitors already were amassing
substantial portfolios.49 There was considerable uncertainty about the
reliability of software patents even after Diehr,50 and firms that saw them as
less crucial than Microsoft and Adobe easily could (and did) forego them.
The other is the decision in Computer Associates v. Altai 51 and its progeny
such as Lotus v. Borland 52 signaling the limited ongoing reliability of copyright as a system for protecting innovation in software.53
D. The 1990s: Proliferation of Software Patents
As others already have documented in detail, the 1990s brought a rapid
acceleration in the growth of patents in the software industry, as the problems
with copyright became more evident, as the legal environment became more
supportive, and as the pace of software innovation grew with the spread of
47. We discuss in more detail below the distinction between software firms that profit primarily
from the sale of off-the-shelf products and those that profit primarily from the sale of softwarerelated services.
48. One reason that the discovery was “belated” is that the PTO seems to have dragged its feet
considerably in response to the patent applications that the software firms started filing in the mid1980s, which had the effect of increasing the head start of applications that those firms had by the
time their competitors learned of the applications.
49. The tone of surprise is evident from the press coverage that greeted a 1989 patent by
Quarterdeck on an early form of “Windows” technology. See Patent Is Won by Quarterdeck, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1989, at D4 (suggesting, wrongly as it turns out, that it was “unusual” to receive a
software patent and that the patent could be more important than Apple’s battle with Microsoft over
copyright protection for its graphic user interface).
50. For example, Donald Chisum argued vehemently that Benson needed to be explicitly
overruled to clear the way for a sensible system of software patenting. See Donald S. Chisum, The
Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 961 (1986) (calling the Benson decision
poorly reasoned and inconsistent with later case law). On the other side of the issue, Pamela
Samuelson argued in 1990 that the PTO had gone too far to tolerate software patents and that the
courts needed to step in to prevent the proliferation of patents in the area. See Samuelson, supra
note 6, at 1029 (restating “the case against patent protection for algorithms”).
51. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
53. See Josh Lerner & Feng Zhu, What Is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from
Lotus v. Borland (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11168, 2005), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11168.pdf (examining the impact of the series of decisions leading to
and including Lotus v. Borland, and presenting evidence that a reduction in copyright protection led
to more patenting by interface firms).
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the personal computer and then the Internet.54 This produced a rate of patenting that was unimaginable to those in the industry just a few decades
earlier.55
To see how those factors changed the relative patenting rates among
various types of software firms, we present in Figures 3 and 4 data on the
patenting practices from 1990–2001 of three groups of large firms that survived throughout the entire period and now have substantial software
patenting portfolios: electronics firms, prepackaged software firms, and
system-design firms.56 As those figures illustrate (with alternate data on
patents as a function of sales and as a function of R&D), electronics firms
already had established stable patenting practices and thus experienced only
a modest rise in patenting rates from 1990–2001, while the firms in the other
two sectors, more focused on software, experienced an increase of 300%–
500%. The point is illustrated more clearly in Figure 5, which shows the
patenting rates for one prominent firm from each sector: HP’s line has only a
slight upward trend, while the Microsoft and IBM lines show much steeper
increases that are surprisingly parallel given the common perception that
Microsoft is a relative latecomer to the patent sweepstakes.

54. See David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting OpenSource Software: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 313,
321 (2003) (noting the favorable conditions that led to the increase in software patents during the
1990s).
55. See Kleinfield, supra note 28, at D6 (quoting Goetz’s comment that “[i]f the Patent Office
were to become receptive to giving out patents on software, I doubt that there would be more than a
few hundred applications a year”).
56. The firms are distinguished by three-digit North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) codes: 334 for the electronics firms (Apple, EMC, HP, NCR, Qualcomm, and Sun), 511
for the prepackaged software firms (Adobe, Autodesk, Computer Associates, Microsoft, Oracle,
Sybase, and Synopsys), and 541 for the system-design and processing firms (EDS, IBM, Mentor
Graphics, Novell, and Unisys).

2007]

Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry

Figure 3: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in Sales
(by Sector) (1990–2001)

Figure 4: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in R&D
(by Sector) (1990–2001)
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Figure 5: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in Sales
(by Firm) (1990–2001)

Figure 6: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in R&D
(by Firm) (1990–2001)

The data on patenting as a function of R&D is particularly illuminating,
given the industry focus on the ratio of patenting to R&D dollars.57 Indeed,
some researchers have become concerned that patents might be substituting

57. See Randall Stross, Why Bill Gates Wants 3,000 New Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, at
BU3 (attributing Microsoft’s conclusion that it was underpatenting to its comparatively low ratio of
patents to R&D dollars).
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for research expenditures.58 Others, however, have pointed out that patenting
and R&D affect one another and are driven by similar factors.59
What we do know (as illustrated by the descriptive data in Figures 2, 4,
and 6 above) is that the propensity to patent in the industry increased rapidly
during the early part of the 1990s. It is evident, however, that the rapid upward trend ended quite some time ago, perhaps by 1997. Indeed, if the
comparative charts suggest anything, it is that R&D expenditures as a function of sales have grown more rapidly in the prepackaged software sector
than in the others.
In general, however, none of this tells us whether firms are innovating
more or less, or whether the patents are of a higher or lower quality. Rather,
these charts suggest that the firms in the industry, for the reasons discussed
above, were steadily instituting processes to protect more of their technologies and protecting things that might be less “valuable” or less central to their
existing products. Thus, the shift in propensity to patent might reflect a conscious decision to protect more of the things that the firm has developed that
are not yet marketed (and thus protected through secrecy). In short, whereas
firms in the 1980s patented their most fundamental and crucial technologies,
the modern software firm with a patenting portfolio is likely to patent as a
matter of routine.60
III. Explaining the Pattern of Patents in the Modern Software Industry
A. Introduction
Turning from history to the modern software industry, what we see now
is a complex pattern of software patenting influenced by features of the firm.
Although the frequency of patenting is a major topic of public debate, little
work has been done to explain the pattern of patenting.61 To be sure, the

58. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 38–41 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), available at http://www.researchon
innovation.org/swpat.pdf (arguing that software patents substitute for R&D spending); see also
Robert M. Hunt, When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 90 (2006)
(“[F]irms that concentrated on obtaining software patents experienced a . . . significant decline in
their R&D intensity, relative to other firms.”). Bessen and Hunt published a portion of this article in
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 157 (2007). Two of us discuss some of the problems with their approach in Allison &
Mann, supra note 7.
59. Ashish Arora, Marco Ceccagnoli & Wesley M. Cohen, R&D and the Patent Premium 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at http://papers.nber.
org/papers/w9431.pdf.
60. Along the way, the industry has transitioned from one with a small number of relatively
broad “pioneering patents” to one with a large number of narrow patents, which has caused
justifiable concern about the transaction costs of licensing.
61. Although the literature provides no definitive theoretical framework for predicting when
patents will be useful, an article by Wesley Cohen and his coauthors takes steps toward a general
explanation as part of a description of differences between the United States and Japan. Wesley M.
Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents, and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United
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existing literature does recognize a rough cross-licensing equilibrium among
the incumbent firms.62 Many of those firms have substantial patent
portfolios, but a web of explicit or implicit cross-licensing agreements means
that the major incumbents have access to most of the patented technologies
in the industry. Thus, those firms compete against each other, for the most
part, on product design and marketing. At this point, patent-based market
power does not appear to be a significant factor.
If the desire to build portfolios for defensive purposes were the main
justification for patents in the industry, however, one would expect portfolios
roughly proportionate to litigation exposure. Assuming that the firm’s size is
a reasonable proxy for litigation exposure, this suggests an easy quantitative
inquiry. Specifically, if the defensive portfolio hypothesis is correct, patent
portfolios would correlate closely with size, and there would not be a great
deal of variation tied to other factors such as market sector or R&D intensity.
Because there are in fact notable differences in patenting practices in
different sectors of the software industry,63 we expect that the pattern of patenting will depend not only on size, but also on whether the firm focuses on
selling products or services, how devoted the firm is to R&D (conventionally
measured by R&D intensity, calculated as $R&D/employee), whether the
firm is primarily a software firm or a hardware/electronics firm, and competitive issues in the specific sector of the software industry in which the firm
is located.
To examine those questions, we combined patent data with data about
firms in Software Magazine’s Software 500 from 1998–2002.64 Because we
States, 31 RES. POL’Y 1349 (2002). In their view, patents can play two distinct roles: as tools for
exclusion (to be exploited through production within the patenting firm), and as tools for licensing
(to be exploited through licensing outside the boundary of the patenting firm). Id. at 1365. They
develop a distinction between “discrete” and “complex” products, finding evidence to support the
idea that “complex” product industries in the United States rely more heavily on licensing to permit
exploitation outside the boundaries of the firm. Id.
62. For a detailed discussion, see Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the
Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961, 990–92 (2005).
63. See Mann & Sager, supra note 7, at 198–99 (finding a significant correlation between
number of patents and software-industry subsector).
64. The Software 500 ranks the top 500 firms in the software industry each year by software
revenue. The Software 500, SOFTWARE MAG., June 1999, at 32, 32. Software Magazine collects
information for the Software 500 from an annual vendor survey, public documents, press releases,
SEC filings, and industry analysts. Id. Based on interviews within the industry, we have the
impression that the survey response rate is quite high. The list appears to be widely regarded as
authoritative within the industry. Campbell-Kelly, for example, uses the list pervasively in his
comprehensive history of the industry. See CAMPBELL-KELLY, supra note 41, passim. Among
other things, it is considerably more comprehensive than the “Softletter 100,” which is limited to
prepackaged software providers and thus generally excludes services firms. See Stewart J.H.
Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software Industry, in
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 219, 232–33 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A.
Merrill eds., 2003) (using the trade newsletter “Softletter 100” to identify trends in software
patenting).
Because of considerable turnover in the industry, that list includes about 1,000 firms for the fiveyear period. For each firm, the Software 500 includes several data points of interest, total revenues,

2007]

Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry

1595

are interested in the characteristics that relate to software patents, we divided
the data set of 34,000 patents into software and nonsoftware patents. The
methodology was to examine the patents individually to determine whether
each patent, properly speaking, should be considered a patent on a software
invention.65 Using that methodology, about 68% (13,500) of the non-IBM
patents and about 55% of the IBM patents (extrapolating from the sample
that we examined), qualified as software patents for a blended total of about
62% (21,200) of software patents.66 As Table 1 illustrates, the patents were
highly concentrated—more than 80% of the firms had not even a single
patent, and less than 10% had more than one patent.

total revenues from software-related activities, percent of revenues expended on research and
development, number of employees, and percent of revenues generated by the sale of services.
Because the purpose of our study is to focus on firms that fairly can be characterized as software
firms, we excluded the eighteen firms that did not derive at least 20% of their total revenues from
software in any of the five years for which we collected data.
65. Allison examined all of the patents except the patents for IBM and categorized each patent
for which at least one claim element covered data processing as a software patent. For the 14,000
IBM patents, he read a random sample of 325 patents and extrapolated from that sample. The
distinction is a difficult one because there is no specific patent class for software patents. Prior
scholars have taken one of two approaches. First, Graham and Mowery look at the portfolios of
large prepackaged software firms and develop a set of classes that includes most of their patents.
Graham & Mowery, supra note 64, at 220. Second, Bessen and Hunt develop a keyword search
designed to capture software patents. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 58, at 8. Although our approach
arguably is more subjective, we believe that the increased accuracy makes it preferable. For a more
detailed explanation of our definition of a software patent and what we view as its superiority to
other attempts to identify data sets of software patents, see Allison & Mann, supra note 7
(manuscript at 8–14).
66. To provide additional data points for robustness checks (as described below), we
subsequently collected a set of all of the patents issued to the firms from January 1, 2003, through
June 30, 2005 (an additional 20,000 patents), but we did not analyze those patents to determine
whether they were software patents or not.
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We examined the variation in patenting by constructing a patent
production function to identify the factors that might influence the number of
patents a firm produces.67 Because we are interested in software patents, we
estimated two sets of models: one using only software patents and a second
using total patents. The sections that follow report our findings on the five
explanations discussed above: size, share of revenues from product licensing,
R&D intensity, share of revenues from hardware sales, and industry sector.
B. Analysis
1. Patenting and Size.—As suggested above, it is natural to expect that
patenting would correlate with size to some degree. This might be true because of economies of scale in patenting, it might be true because larger
firms are more likely to have matured to the stage where they can develop
sophisticated patenting policies, or it might be true because larger firms are
more likely to derive value from patents than smaller firms. Or, it might
simply relate to litigation exposure, as discussed above.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize our analysis. Table 2 presents the software
patent model, and Table 3 presents the total patent model. We report tstatistics in parentheses after the coefficient. Given its intuitive appeal, it is

67. Our analysis is similar to that used in Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The
Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,
1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001). Following Hall & Ziedonis, supra, and Jerry
Hausman, Bronwyn H. Hall & Zvi Griliches, Econometric Models for Count Data with an
Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship, 52 ECONOMETRICA 909 (1984), and Bessen &
Hunt, supra note 58, we estimate our models using both Poisson and negative binomial
distributional assumptions.
Similar to previous work, we assume that the number of patents applied for in a year is a
function of a firm’s R&D spending and other characteristics of the firm. The subscript i denotes the
firm, and the subscript t denotes the year. The number of patents produced by firm i at time t is
denoted by the variable yit. We assume that the number of patents is a function of observable and
unobservable factors. The primary estimates in this Article assume that the unobserved component
has a Poisson distribution. Under the Poisson distribution assumption the expectation of yit takes
the form:

∑(y

it

) = exp( xit β ) .

The expectation of the model is a function of observed exogenous variables xit and a vector of
parameters β. The parameters of the model are estimated using maximum likelihood. We note here
an important feature of our analysis. In general, a maximum likelihood model will not be consistent
unless the distributional assumption of the model is correct. However, C. Gourieroux, A. Montfort
& A. Trognon, Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Application to Poisson Models, 52
ECONOMETRICA 701, 701 (1984) show that if the mean of the above equation is correctly specified,
then the estimate of β will be consistent even if the data rejects the Poisson distributional
assumption. The standard errors must be corrected to be robust to alternative distributions. This is
important because the assumption that the variance of the Poisson model is equal to the mean is
restrictive and often (as with the data here) incorrect in practice, typically when the excess of the
variance over the mean reflects “overdispersion.” We discuss in detail below how we have
addressed the problems in matching the distributional assumptions of those models to the
characteristics of this data set.
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not surprising that size is relevant, measured by log(Employee).68 That
variable has a stable sign (positive) and a stable magnitude (slightly more
than one in all four models), and is statistically and economically significant
in each of the four models. Because the variable is a log transformation of
the raw employee data, the coefficient should be interpreted as a constant
elasticity. For instance, all other things held constant, the coefficient of 1.17
in Column 1 of Table 2 on log(Employee) implies that a 10.0% increase in
the number of employees causes an 11.7% increase in the number of software patents.69 Because this coefficient is slightly more than one, it suggests
that returns to scale in number of employees are approximately constant in
the software industry. In other words, other things held equal, firms patent in
proportion to their size, so that if the number of employees is doubled, we
would expect the firm to produce slightly more than twice the number of
patents.
Table 2: Propensity to Produce Software Patents

68. Because of the skewed distribution, we regress log(Employee) rather than the raw data on
number of employees.
69. This result is slightly higher, but comparable to other results found in the literature,
including Hall & Ziedonis’s calculation of a coefficient of 0.989 in the semiconductor industry. See
Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 67, at 116 tbl.1. It also is slightly higher than Bessen and Hunt’s
calculation of a coefficient of 0.880 in the production of software patents by firms that are for the
most part outside the software industry. See Bessen & Hunt, supra note 58, at 50 tbl.5.
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Table 3: Propensity to Produce Patents

The size of the coefficient sheds light on the relation between size and
patenting practices. For example, if the acquisition of patents were substantially more attractive for larger firms than for smaller firms, the coefficient
would be substantially greater than one.70 If the acquisition of patents were
substantially more attractive for smaller firms than for larger firms, the coefficient would be substantially less than one because the size of the portfolio
would not increase as quickly as the size of the firm. Because the coefficient
is so close to one, it seems likely that the other variables in our model have
captured the size-related reasons why patents have different utilities for
firms.
2. Products and Services.—The most promising explanation for the
variation in patenting practices, drawn from the management literature,

70. The absence of a large coefficient here seems to be in tension with the predictions of
Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner about the relative importance of patenting for large
firms. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55
(2005) (“For large firms, a major driver of patenting behavior is the need to create substantial patent
portfolios—independent of the expected values of any particular individual patents.”).
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focuses on a continuum from products firms to services firms.71 Firms that
sell software products generally have higher operating margins, higher
growth rates, and less stable market shares, whereas services firms generally
have lower operating margins and lower growth rates, but can more readily
establish stable market positions.72 Thus, a products firm such as Microsoft
will have high volume sales of noncustomized products that customers can
use “off the shelf” with little or no assistance, and a typical services firm
such as EDS will generate revenues by helping firms to install, design, and
maintain software. The products model is relatively more effective for
venture-backed start-ups than the services model. Because products firms
can “scale,” i.e., achieve economies of scale, more easily than services firms,
successful products firms are more likely to produce the high returns venture
capital investors seek. There also are a large number of hybrid firms like
Oracle. Some of those firms began by attempting to sell products, but later
were forced by market conditions to provide increasing levels of
customization, thus degrading their ability to sell high volumes of a pure
high-margin product. To get a sense for the variation, Figure 7 displays the
differing shares of revenues attributable to product licensing for five of the
largest software firms.73
Figure 7: Products Revenue Share for Leading Software Firms in 2002

71. See MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS OF SOFTWARE 25–26 (2004) (describing a
products firm as one that makes the majority of its revenues by volume sales of software packages,
while services firms customize products for each customer and provide training, maintenance, and
technical support).
72. See id.
73. Although accounting practices might differ slightly, product licensing encompasses the fees
generated from software products and excludes services revenue related to maintenance, support,
consulting, and the like.
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Given the obvious difference in appropriation strategies, the products–
services distinction provides a useful lens for exploring the apparent disparity
of patenting practices in the industry. Patents seem likely to be a relatively
more effective tool for protecting innovation in products than in services. To
the extent a firm can provide a unique level of skilled services, it may be feasible to maintain much of the differentiating knowledge in a tacit form,
bound up with the skills of the individual employees. Conversely, a products
firm that sends its product out into the marketplace in many instances will be
vulnerable to appropriation by competitors.74 If so, a patent that permits a
firm to fence out competitors will have considerably more value to a products firm than to a services firm. This, in turn, suggests the hypothesis that
products firms, because their technology is more difficult to protect than the
technology of services firms, will produce more patents than services firms,
all other things being equal.
Because the Services variable is a fraction of software revenues, and
because our hypothesis is that the devotion of the firm to a products model
should relate positively to the firm’s propensity to patent innovations related
to software, the results in Table 2 should provide the clearest test of our primary hypothesis, with Table 3 primarily relevant as a robustness check. In
Table 2, the Services variable is negative and significantly related to the dependent variable in all of the different runs. The impact of the Services
variable on the number of patents also appears to be economically
significant. For example, referring to the base (Poisson) model in Column 1,
the coefficient suggests that a 1.0% increase in the percentage of software
sales coming from services (e.g., percentage of sales increasing from 50.0%
to 51.0%), implies a 2.3% decrease in the number of patents produced.75 A
more extreme result suggests that the magnitude of the Services variable is
also economically significant. A firm that derives all its revenues from
products (e.g., Service = 0%) is expected to produce 230% more patents than
a firm entirely devoted to providing services (e.g., Service = 100%).
These findings are robust. For example, the sign and general magnitude
of the coefficient were stable in a model (reported in Column 2 of Table 2)

74. See Mann, supra note 62, at 985 (noting that many companies cannot reap the rewards of
excluding competitors unless they can survive to a stage where they are profiting from their own
exploitation of a product); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2333–39 (1994) (explaining that much of the
value of software is in its surface design that is “prominently displayed by the program in
operation,” and “[a]ny product that bears a large quantum of its know-how on its face is vulnerable
to rapid imitative copying because this know-how cannot be kept secret”).
75. Although the goodness-of-fit test rejects the Poisson distributional assumption, we
nevertheless report the results of this analysis, following prior statistical practice. See Gourieroux,
Montfort & Trognon, supra note 67. As recommended there, we use heteroscedastic-consistent
standard errors to calculate t-statistics. The goodness of fit test is based on the deviance statistic.
The standard error estimates used to compute the t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and
misspecification of the distribution. To account for the multiple observations of some firms and the
consequent possibility of autocorrelation, the standard errors are clustered.
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using a negative binomial distributional assumption instead of our base
Poisson assumption.76 The parallel runs using total patents as the dependent
variable, reported in Table 3, are similar.77 Most importantly (as summarized
in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2), we also estimated a series of models that
include sector-specific fixed effects to control for differences in the propensity to patent across different sectors in the software industry.78 Inclusion of
the sector-fixed effects is important for two reasons.79 First, the estimates in
Columns 1 and 2 do not indicate whether the Services variable is capturing
different propensities to patent that relate to differences between sectors, or
whether the product–services distinction is also important within sectors.
Inclusion of the sector-specific fixed effects along with the Services variable
focuses the test of the Services variable. Specifically, this model shows that
the products–services distinction is important within sectors.
The results of the Poisson model and the negative binomial model both
indicate that the Services variable continues to be negative as well as
statistically and economically significant. What this suggests is that the
devotion of a firm to a products or services model is important, even within a
particular sector. Thus, the data do not suggest simply that some sectors of
the industry rely more on products and some more on services or that those
differences can explain levels of patenting activity. Rather, the data suggest
important differences along the products–services continuum, even within
particular sectors. To be sure, the magnitude of the coefficients on the
Services variable does drop considerably (from 0.023 and 0.040 to 0.015 and
0.020, respectively), but this merely suggests that sector differences capture a
portion of the difference in patenting activity.80

76. We use a negative binomial model because the goodness of fit test suggested that our data is
overdispersed. The negative binomial model is consistent only if the true distribution is negative
binomial; however, if this is the true specification, then the estimate is more efficient than the
Poisson model. Referring to Column 2 of Table 2, the parameter alpha is the overdispersion
parameter. The high t-statistic, indicating that alpha is significantly different from zero, indicates
that overdispersion remains even in the negative binomial model.
77. This has the advantage of having more data points (because we can use the additional
20,000 patents from 2003–2005), but it has the disadvantage that we must analyze total patents
rather than software patents (because we have not divided the later patents into software and
nonsoftware patents). In any event, those runs produced results and coefficients similar to those set
out in Table 2.
78. We test the joint statistical significance of the sector-specific fixed effects by using a
likelihood ratio test based on the selected sample. For both models, we reject the null hypothesis
that the sector-specific fixed effects have no explanatory power at the 95% confidence level.
79. Inclusion of sector-specific fixed effects necessitates dropping several observations from
the analysis. Sectors that have no patents are excluded from the analysis because the sector-specific
fixed effects entirely explain the number of patents in those sectors. In addition, the sector category
marked “other” is also excluded because it does not represent any particular sector. The sectorspecific-fixed-effect estimates are based on the remaining 612 observations from the 445 remaining
firms.
80. In separate runs that we do not report here in detail, we attempted to analyze the differences
in patent production functions for products and services firms. See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 67,
at 119 (using similar analysis for semiconductor firms). Although our analysis strongly rejects the
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We emphasize the ambiguity of causation in this finding. On the one
hand, it might well be that firms have a higher propensity to patent because
they are products firms, either because of the greater ability of those patents
to protect innovation in products or because of the greater need to protect
innovation that is disclosed through the distribution of products. Conversely,
it might well be that a patenting culture in a firm’s early days could contribute to its survival as a products firm. Referring back to Figures 1 and 2, the
most dominant products firms (Microsoft and Adobe, with 100% and 99%
products revenue shares) were among the earliest prepackaged software firms
to start patenting, while the three late patentees shown in those figures survive today as the most prominent hybrid firm (Oracle, with a 35% products
revenue share) and as two of the largest services firms (Autodesk and
Computer Associates, with 0% products revenue shares). It is at least
possible to believe that the late patenting strategies of those firms undermined their competitive position in products markets and forced their retreat
into the realm of nonproducts firms.
3. Patenting and R&D Intensity.—The next possibility is that a firm’s
R&D intensity affects its production of patents. Specifically, assuming that
the firm has the same number of employees, the same share of products–
services revenues, and is in the same sector in the industry, will the number
of patents relate to the intensity of R&D investment (measured by dollars of
R&D investment per employee)? The discussion in Part II regarding the increase in the number of patents as a function of R&D strongly suggests that
R&D intensity is important. Not surprisingly, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that
R&D intensity does explain an important portion of the variation in patenting
rates.
Like the previous variables, R&D intensity has a stable sign (positive)
and a coefficient that is both statistically and economically significant.
Specifically, the elasticity of R&D intensity on patenting is 0.89. Again, this
is similar to the results found by Bessen and Hunt of 1.01.81 However, these
estimates are much larger than results in the semiconductor industry of 0.18

possibility that the patent production functions are the same, it is not easy to interpret our findings
about how they differ. For example, we found that the elasticity of software patent production with
respect to R&D intensity is greater for products firms and services firms and that the elasticity of
software patent production with respect to employees is greater for services firms than for products
firms. On the other hand, looking at the elasticity of total patent production, we find that services
firms have a greater elasticity for both R&D intensity and employees than products firms. Neither
of those differences, however, is significant. Our tentative inclination is to accept the results related
to software patent production, concluding that the greater heterogeneity in our data set on total
patents makes it less useful for analyzing the factors related to patent production.
81. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 58, at 19. Bessen and Hunt find different results when
accounting for firm-level heterogeneity using fixed effects. Id. However, their fixed-effect
estimation excludes firms with zero patents. Id. Such firms include a majority of firms in this
Article and in the Bessen and Hunt article. Therefore, we compare the basic Poisson regressions as
these include all firms and are less prone to sample-selection bias.
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found by Hall and Ziedonis.82 Generally, this suggests that although the effects of size in the software industry are about the same as those in the
semiconductor industry, the effect of R&D intensity on software patenting is
quite a bit greater than its effect on semiconductor patenting.
4. Patenting and Hardware Revenues.—Another possibility we
attempted to test is that hardware or systems firms will have different
patenting strategies than pure software firms. This hypothesis is drawn from
the common suggestion in interviews with software executives that the typical hardware firm has a culture that is different from that of the typical
software firm: the typical hardware-firm culture emphasizes institutions that
facilitate patenting; the typical software-firm culture resists those
institutions.83 Because the hypothesis here relates to the overall patenting
philosophy of the firm, the hypothesis is tested more directly with the data on
total patents in Table 3.
The results here are markedly less robust than for the other variables.
The relevant variable for this question is Fraction Software Sales. As Table
3 displays, the results range from marginal statistical significance (in the
Poisson model) to no significance in the other models. The coefficient is
also quite small, though usually with the negative sign that the hypothesis
suggests (indicating that firms with higher shares of revenues from software
rather than other lines of business are likely to have fewer patents than firms
with lower shares of revenue from software sales).84
What is most interesting about those results is the small coefficient,
which suggests that any distinction between the patenting practices of pure
software firms and firms with substantial nonsoftware revenues is slight. In
light of the history summarized in Part II, this suggests that by the time our
data were collected, the cultural resistance to patenting in the software industry had lost much of its force. Even if there is a slight lingering
distinction, patenting already had become as routine for software firms as it
had long been for hardware firms.
5. Patenting and Software Sectors.—The final variable we considered
was the relation between industry sectors and patenting propensities. As discussed above, differences among the widely heterogeneous sectors in the
software industry may explain some of the differences in patenting practices
between firms. The question remains, in light of the sections above, whether
our more general variables capture the reasons for patenting variations
82. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 67, at 116 tbl.1.
83. See Mann, supra note 62, at 982–85 (discussing concerns that an emphasis on patenting will
divert a firm’s focus from product development).
84. We have also run a number of robustness checks. These include not only the Table 2
models analyzing software patenting rates (rather than total patenting rates), but also checks that
include a number of outliers with very large portfolios, a random-effect Poisson estimate with
sector-specific fixed effects, and firm-level fixed effects. Those results are similar to those we
report in the text.
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between sectors. The problem in using the “Software 500” sector
designations is that Software Magazine, during the period for which we collected data, used more than 100 different sector designations, many of which
include very few firms. Accordingly, we constructed a modified set of sectoral designations, which consolidates the Software 500’s designations into
“only” 36 sectors.85 Table 4 below lists the different sectors and provides
basic descriptive statistics for the firms in each sector.
Table 4: Software Sector Descriptive Statistics (1998 and 1999)

The variation in the median of size and service revenue underscores the
heterogeneity of the sectors. For example, the median data-warehousing firm
has about 5,000 employees, while the median disaster-recovery firm has only
38. Similarly, the typical data-warehousing firm derives only 12% of its
revenues from services, while the median retail-applications firm derives
74% of its revenues from services.
Of particular import for our work is the variation in patenting practices,
with quite a number of reasonably well-populated sectors entirely devoid of
patents (human-resources software, for example), and others in which
85. A good deal of our consolidation reflected collapsing different designations used from year
to year for similar firms.

1606

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 85:1579

substantial portfolios exist (operating-systems and systems-integration
services, for example, with an average of more than forty patents per firm).
Table 5 presents a more rigorous examination of that question—a sectorfixed effect analysis designed to illustrate the particular effects on patenting
propensity of each of the sectors. As you would expect given the discussion
above, Table 5 illustrates stark differences among sectors that are not captured by the other variables.
Perhaps the most interesting point from that table is the apparent
relation between concentration in a particular sector and patenting
propensity. As Figure 8 illustrates, the sectors with the highest propensities
to patent have fewer firms per sector than the sectors with moderate or low
propensities to patent. It is difficult to be sure why industry concentration
would relate to patenting propensity. One possibility suggested by Cockburn
and MacGarvie is that the presence of substantial patent portfolios may deter
further entry into the sector.86 Another possibility is that weaker firms disappear as sectors mature. If substantial portfolios are a feature of relatively
mature firms, we would expect mature sectors to have a smaller number of
firms with greater average rates of patenting. The breakdown of sectors in
Table 5 provides some support for this possibility.
Figure 8: Patenting Rates and Sector Concentration

86. See Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 33 (“Controlling for the characteristics of the
firm and market, we find that software firms are less likely to enter product markets in which there
are more patents.”). One problem with that explanation, at least with respect to Cockburn and
MacGarvie’s data, is that they analyze entry in any given year as a function of existing patent
portfolios. But most venture-backed software start-ups do not obtain patents until after several
years of operation. Accordingly, a sector in which several firms already have strong portfolios is
likely to be a sector of relatively mature technology. It should be no surprise that the rate of entry
will slow in such a sector, but it is just as likely attributable to the head-start and first-mover
advantages of the existing firms as it is to the exclusive force of the patents held by the existing
firms.
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Fitting this together, three points warrant emphasis. First, although patenting does relate to the size of the firm, the pattern is complex, with other
variables explaining important parts of the picture. Second, the variables that
are most successful in explaining patenting variations are the variables that
explain the firm’s particular niche within the software industry—the distinction between products and services is central, but the extent to which a firm
has nonsoftware business lines is not important. Third, although we have not
emphasized it above, it is interesting that the results in Table 2 are so similar
to the results in Table 3. Given the common anecdotal impression that software patents can be much less effective at appropriating the value of
innovation than hardware patents,87 we would have expected the patent
production functions for software patents and total patents to differ
substantially. The similarity of those functions suggests, again, that the use
of software patents is converging rapidly with the use of patents in adjacent
sectors.
IV. The Role of Patents in Software Development
A complete picture of the software industry cannot be limited to
incumbent firms. As others have recognized, the industry experiences high
rates of new entry and turnover among firms of all sizes.88 Much of the reason for this phenomenon is that a great deal of the new technology in the
industry is developed not by incumbent firms in the first instance, but rather
by one of three development channels that are distinct from the incumbent
firms: venture-backed firms, open-source development, and independent
inventors.89 As they do for the incumbent firms, patents play a distinct role
in the success of firms from each of those channels.
A. The Venture-Backed Start-up Channel
The first and most prominent channel is the venture-backed start-up
channel.90 In this channel, venture capital firms serve as investment
intermediaries, providing capital and management expertise to young firms
seeking to make their way into the industry.91 This channel, of course, has

87. See Mann, supra note 62, at 980 n.102 (presenting anecdotal evidence that software
executives view software patents as generally easier to work around and less useful than hardware
patents).
88. See Merges, supra note 7, at 7 (finding that turnover rates in the software industry are
comparably higher than many other industries). For a quantitative analysis, see Cockburn &
MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 16–17, 49 fig.2 (describing and plotting the turnover rates in software
markets).
89. The channels are not mutually exclusive. For example, there are a number of open-source
venture-backed start-ups, and smaller venture-backed start-ups may resemble independent inventors
in many respects. See Mann, supra note 20, at 13 (finding more than 100 open-source firms in the
United States in which there has been venture capital investment).
90. This subpart draws heavily on Mann & Sager, supra note 7.
91. Id. at 193.
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produced many of the most prominent success stories, with Google providing
the most salient recent example.92 As mentioned in Part III, venture
financing tends to favor products firms, primarily because successful
products firms are much more capable of achieving economies of scale
(“scaling”) quickly than services firms.93 Because the quick ability to scale
relates closely to the ability of venture capitalists to obtain the return they
seek on their investments, this model tends to work much better for products
firms.
Patents do play an important role for start-up firms. As one of us has
explained previously, patents provide little benefit to the early stage prerevenue start-up firm.94 But as the firm matures and begins to develop revenue
streams, patents become increasingly important.95 The reason can be that the
firm needs the patents to prevent larger firms from copying its products. The
reason also can be that the patents will be important to investors as the firm’s
financing needs increase. Or it might be that the patent signals something
about the firm’s sophistication or management acumen. Whatever the
reason, however, interviews with investors and entrepreneurs strongly
suggest that patents can be important for venture-backed software start-ups.96
The perspective is not unanimous. Many, if not most, investors recognize the
limited value that patents have for appropriating the value of a software
innovation, and thus, they worry about how their portfolio firms will defend
a market share even if their firms can develop a significant product.97
That perspective is buttressed by the available data about the role of
patents in venture-backed start-ups. Although only about 25% of venturebacked firms obtain patents,98 there is a close relation between the acquisition
92. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES
BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 89 (2005) (recounting how Google obtained
millions of dollars in venture capital funds).
93. For the same reason, computer and peripheral firms are not as readily suited to venture
capital investment.
For example, the PricewaterhouseCoopers National Venture Capital
Association MoneyTree Report lists 869 software investments for $4.8 billion for 2005. See
PricewaterhouseCoopers & National Venture Capital Association, MoneyTree Report,
http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/moneytree/nav.jsp?page=historical (select “Software” in the “Select
Industry” drop-down menu). But the report shows only sixty-one investments in computer and
peripheral firms, which total only $500 million for the same year. See id. (select “Computer and
Peripherals” in the “Select Industry” drop-down menu).
94. See Mann, supra note 62, at 981 (summarizing findings of why developing patents are not
so effective in the early stages of a firm).
95. See Mann & Sager, supra note 7, at 202 (“[There is] some support for the hypothesis that
the value of patents for software startups first becomes significant as they reach the stage at which
they begin to generate revenues.”).
96. Mann, supra note 62, at 981–82.
97. Id. at 978–79.
98. Mann & Sager, supra note 7, at 205. The share of firms with patents in this venture-backed
data set is higher than the share of firms with patents in the Software 500 data set described in Part
III. This is true, presumably, because the venture-backed data set includes a smaller share of
services firms. See id. (noting that products firms are much more common in the venture-backed
data set).
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of patents and the progress of firms through the venture capital cycle. Thus,
for example, firms with patents are likely to obtain more financing, and they
are more likely to succeed.99 In general, the relevance of patents to mature
and successful portfolio firms is consistent with the discussion at the end of
Part II. As these firms mature, patenting becomes a routine part of the firm’s
operations, just as it has been for many software incumbents for the last
decade.
For our purposes, the exit strategy is what is most important about the
venture-backed start-up channel. Generally, the venture-backed start-up that
develops a successful product will exit from its start-up status in one of two
ways. First, it might obtain sufficient funds (generally from public investors)
to become a large firm, ascending to the ranks of the incumbent firms in the
industry (like Google).100 Alternatively (perhaps much more commonly), it
might sell its technology (normally through a sale of the entire firm) to one
of the large incumbent firms.101
What is most unlikely to happen is litigation—rare is the start-up firm
that exploits its technology through patent litigation against a large incumbent firm.102 Although economic theory suggests that it often is difficult for
one firm to transfer valuable information to another (Arrow’s information
paradox103), the venture-backed channel avoids that difficulty. Most
obviously, the parties in control of mature venture-backed portfolio firms are
a small class of venture capitalists, often previously employed at large incumbent firms. Thus, it is easy to expect that those people would have
personal relations that would enhance their ability to make credible representations about technology and come to consensual arrangements for
acquisition of the start-up. Similarly, the entrepreneurs themselves, to the
extent they have any control over the process, are likely to be repeat players,
worried about future transactions, and also former employees of incumbent
firms themselves. It is easy to see why successful start-ups often are

99. With respect to financing, firms with patents obtain a median of four rounds rather than
three, worth $26 million rather than $15 million. Id. at 199 tbl.4. Moreover, within five years of
first financing, 13% of the firms with patents go public and only 4% fail. Conversely, 3% of the
firms without patents will have gone public by that point in time and 8% will fail. Id. As reported
in more detail in Mann and Sager’s article, all of those distinctions are statistically significant and
stable across a series of checks for robustness. Id.
100. See id. at 202 & tbl.3 (finding that 5% of the firms in the venture-backed data set had gone
public).
101. See id. (finding that 10% of the firms in the venture-backed data set had been acquired).
102. See Mann, supra note 62, at 981–82 (observing that it is unlikely that an early-stage
company that has a patent would have the resources to enforce the patent against a large firm).
Licensing of technology from start-ups does happen occasionally, though it is rarely the preferred
business model of the venture capitalist. See id. at 982–83 (relating concerns among investors and
developers that an overemphasis on licensing can degrade firm culture by diverting focus from
product development). Rather, it is a strategy to which the firm turns when it is unable to execute
its chosen path.
103. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2267–68 (1999) (discussing Arrow’s information paradox).
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acquired by incumbent firms and why litigation to enforce IP against
incumbent firms is rarely the chosen strategy.
B. The Open-Source Channel
The open-source channel has gained prominence in recent years as
programs like Linux, Apache, and Firefox have been broadly accepted.104
With its roots in the hacker mythology of the early days of the Internet, the
open-source community venerates a decentralized style of software development that is the antithesis of the large bureaucratized incumbent firm.
In the last decade, the open-source community has undergone a
profound change. At the same time as its products have become sufficiently
successful to gain widespread use in large enterprises, the community’s development processes have been adopted by some large incumbent technology
firms—a few from the software industry (like IBM and Novell) but mostly
from adjacent hardware industries (firms like Intel, HP, and Fujitsu).105
Thus, the commercially successful open-source programs share the salient
characteristic that they benefit from extensive financial support from large
incumbent firms.106 The firms making those investments have done so as
part of a “value-chain” strategy, in which the firms seek to commoditize a
part of a value chain in which they are unlikely to dominate (like the operating system), hoping to extract value at some other part of a value chain (like
the servers on which the operating system runs, the middleware that runs on
the stack above the operating system, or the services necessary to assemble
all of those pieces into a well-designed “solution”).107
As the software has become commercialized, an increasing number of
purely open-source firms have appeared.108 For the most part, the largest of
these firms depend on sales of services.109 Because open-source software can
be copied and sold freely by competitors, it is difficult to profit directly from
product licensing.110
Accordingly, service companies dominate this
111
market.
The recent battle between Oracle and Red Hat illustrates this
point—Oracle apparently plans to copy Red Hat’s version of Linux,
presumably so that Oracle can profit from licensing products and providing

104. See Mann, supra note 20, at 9–10, 11 n.43 (noting that the quality and free dissemination
of Linux, Apache, and Firefox have led to their increased use).
105. See id. at 24 (noting that these firms invest substantially in the development of Linux).
106. See id. at 12 (discussing the ties between open-source communities and incumbent firms).
107. Id. at 24–25.
108. See id. at 13–14 (discussing the proliferation of venture-backed open-source firms).
109. See id. at 34 (observing that the open-source model better suits services firms than
products firms).
110. See id. at 22 (noting that the open-source model makes it impractical to prevent third
parties from exploiting the results of research).
111. Id. at 34–35.
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services related to Linux installations.112 The relative disutility of patents for
services firms together with the communitarian philosophy discussed above
makes it unsurprising that there are few patents held by open-source firms.
Still, patents and other IP rights are crucial to the success of those
strategies in several ways. Most obviously, the incumbent firms use IP to
protect their positions in those parts of the value chain where they plan to
compete. Thus, for example, although IBM has participated generously in
the development of Linux and Apache, and has given the community ready
access to the patents relevant to those projects, it has not abandoned the IP
strategy that protects its investment in its server lines or software products
like WebSphere.113 Also, to the extent that open-source communities are
protected from patent litigation, it is because they operate under the umbrella
of implicit promises of protection from the large patent-holding incumbents
that support their communities.114
To be sure, major parts of the open-source community find these
developments unsatisfying. The Free Software Foundation (FSF) led by
Richard Stallman and Eben Moglen, for example, regularly decries the vice
of patenting software.115 Its revisions of the GPL—the license under which
Linux currently is distributed—reflect a continuing hostility to the increasing
role that patents are playing in the industry.116 But on this point it is increasingly clear that the FSF no longer speaks for the community as a whole.
Thus we see that Linus Torvalds has expressed great dissatisfaction with the
FSF’s position on these issues.117 This is because Torvalds is more concerned about wide deployment and use of Linux.118 Patent-related revisions
to the GPL that make it less congenial to the large firms that participate in the
Linux project are in tension with that concern.
C. The Independent Inventor Channel
The third channel is the independent inventor. This channel is the most
controversial and least susceptible to generalization. Here, we make three
points. First, this channel arguably plays a distinct role in providing valuable
innovation in the industry. Second, independent inventors are likely to
112. For discussion of the Oracle strategy, see, for example, Stephen Shankland, Oracle Has
Yet to Prove Linux Cred, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 27, 2006, http://news.com.com/Oracle+has+yet+
to+prove+Linux+cred/2100-7344_3-6130071.html.
113. Mann, supra note 20, at 26.
114. See id. at 29 (noting that IBM, Sun, and Nokia have issued promises not to enforce their
patents).
115. See supra note 8.
116. See Mann, supra note 20, at 20 (describing GPLv3, which prohibits an entity from using
its own modification of open-source software if that entity attempts to patent that modification).
117. See Charles Babcock, Torvalds on the Cost of GPL 3, INFORMATIONWEEK, Mar. 19,
2007, at 40 (reporting Torvalds’ position that the revisions of the GPL will reduce the simplicity of
the previous version and unduly restrict what users can do with GPL software).
118. See id. (noting that Torvalds will not move the license commitment for the Linux kernel to
GPLv3).
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struggle more than other potential new entrants in transferring technology to
incumbent firms. Third, building on the first two points, the market response
is the creation of intermediaries to facilitate technology transfers between
inventors and incumbents. Although the business models of the intermediaries are diverse, they generally describe themselves as patent acquisition or
management firms and have been labeled pejoratively as “trolls.”119
Generally, those firms exhibit a variety of different strategies that respond to
the various shortcomings that will hinder independent inventors attempting to
exploit their software-related inventions.
1. The Role of Independent Inventors.—The first point is a relatively
subjective one, though nonetheless significant. Although often vilified in the
media as a novel and radical phenomenon, Part II documents the important
challenge that independent inventors have presented to incumbents from the
earliest days of the industry. Indeed, despite the rhetoric that characterizes
the “troll” as an artifact of the rise of the Federal Circuit and related recent
events,120 the inventor that received what often is regarded as the first software patent, more than three decades ago, used his early patents to bolster
efforts to create one of the first software products to enter into serious competition with the “free software” that IBM was then bundling with its
mainframe computers.121
In the current milieu, industry sources (both in large firms and in patent
acquisition firms) accept the notion that independent inventors in the
software industry often have focused on larger “big picture” inventions while
inventors at incumbent firms have largely focused on incremental improvements to existing product lines. Even at firms like Microsoft, with a
corporate culture consciously directed toward forward-thinking innovation,
the ever urgent need to protect and upgrade the firm’s core product lines
makes it hard for researchers to do truly basic research about products that
cannot be deployed in the near term.122
119. E.g., Joe Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 12, 2005,
http://news.com.com/rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-5892996.html; see also John M.
Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2111, 2135 (2007)
(“[U]nder current legal and economic conditions, nonpracticing or otherwise noncompeting patent
holders [so-called trolls] might be at least as likely to be undercompensated as to be
overcompensated.”). But see James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 189–
90 (2006) (demonstrating how “trolls” as market intermediaries provide liquidity, market clearing,
and increased efficiency to patent markets—the same benefits that securities dealers provide to
capital markets).
120. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious
Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 924 (2004) (connecting the success of “patent
trolls” to the Federal Circuit’s presumption of patent validity).
121. Goetz, supra note 13, at 50–53.
122. Henry Chesbrough’s book OPEN INNOVATION (2006) provides detailed and perceptive
documentation of the difficulties that incumbent high-tech firms have faced in their efforts to foster
successfully innovative environments within the boundaries of their own companies.
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Similarly, venture-backed start-ups necessarily have a short time
horizon because the financing model contemplates success or failure in a
relatively short time—typically less than a decade.123 That financing model
may be excellent for certain types of innovations, but the lesson of the discussion of venture-backed start-ups in the previous part is that the constraints
of the venture capital model leave many valuable research opportunities unfunded.
At first glance, it might seem hard to put much weight on the distinction
between independent invention and open-source development—apparently
the essence of independence. And it surely is true that a grassroots strain of
open-source development persists; the development evidenced by the thousands of small independent projects registered at SourceForge.124 But
historically the path to market traction (and funding) for open-source technology has been distinct from the independent inventor channel discussed in
this section. As discussed above, the open-source projects that have gained
substantial market traction ordinarily have succeeded through their adoption
directly into the value chains of large incumbent firms.125 It is also fair to say
that the key to open-source success has been quality of execution coupled
with easy interoperability. Linux and Apache were not visionary advances;
they were high-quality solutions to pressing and immediate programming
needs. In general, then, open-source development has not (so far at least)
provided the path breaking advances at which independent inventors aim.
2. Difficulties of Commercialization for Independent Inventors.—
Several overlapping structural considerations make it natural to expect that
independent inventors might make valuable discoveries in the industry yet
face substantial obstacles that complicate their efforts to commercialize their
inventions. The first is the likelihood for many discoveries that direct exploitation by the inventor will be suboptimal, if not wholly impractical. The
point is yet another variation on the problem mentioned above—the uncomfortable mapping of dozens (if not hundreds) of inventions into the thousands
(or millions) of lines of code in a single software product. An independent
inventor could not practicably commercialize an invention that improves
Internet browsers, even if the invention is path breaking. Thus, the network
effects that entrench existing products suggest that the optimal way to deploy
a new invention related to Internet browsers is to sell it to one of the incumbent browser developers so that it can be incorporated into their product. As
a matter of industry structure, that means that the independent software

123. See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF INVENTION: HOW VENTURE
CAPITAL CREATES NEW WEALTH 99 (2001) (“Almost all venture funds are designed to be selfliquidating, that is, they must dissolve after ten to twelve years.”).
124. SourceForge hosts over 100,000 open-source projects uploaded by individual users.
SourceForge.net, SourceForge.net: About SourceForge.net, http://sourceforge.net/docs/about.
125. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
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inventor is more likely than the independent inventor in other fields to need
the kinds of complex business, financial, and legal competencies that are
necessary for successful negotiations with the large incumbent firms in the
industry.
At the same time, those who populate the independent inventor channel
are less likely to be well placed to conduct such negotiations successfully
than innovators in the parallel channels.126 For example, successful innovators in the venture-backed channel are likely to become incumbent firms
themselves or to transfer their technology to incumbent firms in a consensual
transaction.127 The venture capitalists that control the destiny of venturebacked start-ups are a small group of players, often themselves former executives at incumbent firms, likely to enjoy professional and social
relationships with the individuals at large firms that might be interested in the
technology. Thus, it would be surprising if they could not agree upon a consensual arrangement for transfer of technology to an incumbent firm with a
use for the technology. The rarity of patent infringement litigation between
venture-backed start-ups and incumbent firms underscores the point: despite
the oft-expressed concern about runaway patent litigation, we are aware of
no lawsuit in the industry in which a venture-backed start-up has sued a substantial incumbent firm for patent infringement.
Similarly, products in the open-source channel seem to gain widespread
commercial traction only after they have been adopted into the value chain of
large incumbent firms.128 Because the successful adoption typically involves
a partial merging of the development community with employees of the incumbent (or incumbents) adopting the technology,129 the frequency of
adversarial dispute resolution is small. In any event, the limited frequency of
patenting by open-source communities makes the offensive use of patents a
strategy that is not readily available.
Lacking those relationships, independent inventors (here as in other
contexts)130 have been forced to resort to litigation to extract value from their
126. For this reason, the availability of injunctive relief, the issue contested in eBay, is crucially
important to the intermediaries in this channel. See, e.g., Brief for Rembrandt IP Management, LLC
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of Rembrandt in eBay] (“In the absence of an
injunction, a well-funded infringer either would not take a license from an independent inventor at
all, or would do so on a playing field that vastly favored the infringer.”); Brief for United Inventors
Ass’n & Technology Licensing Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, eBay, 126 S. Ct.
1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of United Inventors Association et al. in eBay] (“Given the
enormous imbalance of resources between big business and individuals, the predictable fight to an
injunction is essential to make licensing a possibility.”).
127. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
129. See Mann, supra note 20, at 12 (noting that a large proportion of important Linux
contributors are now employed by a large proprietary firm, the Open Source Development Labs,
and its corporate sponsors).
130. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465 (2004) (finding that
litigated patents issue disproportionately to individuals or small firms, but often are transferred
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inventions.131 Thus, as we look at patent litigation in recent years in the software industry, we now see that a substantial share of litigation involves such
firms or their subsidiaries.132 To the economist, it might seem odd that negotiations in this channel should fail so frequently. But software technology is
not easy to transfer. For one thing, software inventors often will have difficulty in persuading potential purchasers of the value of their inventions
without disclosing the inventions in some detail. Given the difficulty of
protecting the value of the technology even with a well-considered patenting
program, independent inventors reasonably might be reluctant to make such
disclosures. But a failure to disclose (by hypothesis) will make it harder to
persuade a purchaser to pay the “true” value of the technology—a standard
instance of Arrow’s information paradox.133 In the end, where venturebacked firms could use their connections to get a receptive hearing from incumbent firms, independent inventors that claim to have developed valuable
technology are more likely to be dismissed as “kooks.”134 If they cannot
obtain a serious hearing from large firms, their only recourse is to resort to
legal coercion.135
between issuance and litigation); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Stylized Facts of Patent
Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6297, 1997), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6297.pdf (“[I]ndividual-owned patents are
at least as likely to be litigated as are corporate-owned patents.”).
131. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s discussion of the troubled development of an online music
market provides an instructive parallel. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET? 105–28 (2006). It should have been clear to all concerned parties by 2000 that the
efficiencies of online music distribution eventually would compel some method of easy digital
distribution of music online. But the brash early technology start-ups like MP3.com and Napster
had no success at all in reaching consensual arrangements with the large media providers. See
WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 98–102, 110–20 (2004) (detailing the early history of MP3.com and Napster, and
the subsequent lawsuits by media providers). But Steve Jobs, largely because of personal relations
that spanned the divide between technology firms and the large media companies, was able to reach
agreements in one fell swoop with all of those companies, facilitating both the iTunes store and the
iPod. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra, at 118–21 (discussing the success of iTunes).
132. That is not to say that there is never litigation among incumbents—IBM’s recent filings
against Amazon.com, see infra note 151, and the high-profile litigation between AT&T and
Microsoft, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007), underscore the occasional
inability of large firms to reach rational settlements of these kinds of disputes.
133. See Mann, supra note 103, at 2267–68 (discussing Arrow’s information paradox).
134. For example, despite the general perception in the media (and on Capitol Hill) that NTP’s
patent claims related to the BlackBerry were unfounded, see Ian Austen & Lisa Guernsey, A Payday
for Patents ‘R’ Us, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at C1 (discussing the view of critics that NTP is a
“patent troll”), some industry sources portray Tom Campana (the inventor of the patent in question)
as a thinker of great perception and foresight, see, e.g., Richard Shim, Key Figure in BlackBerry
Case Dies, CNET NEWS.COM, June 17, 2004, http://news.com.com/Key+figure+in+BlackBerry+
case+dies/2100-1041_3-5238198.html (describing Campana as a “tireless and inventive engineer
committed to perfecting the best that wireless technology has to offer”).
135. One interesting, developing battleground in this area is the question of “transparency.”
Incumbent firms call for transparency in the ownership of patenting, so that they readily can identify
the real parties in interest when patents are issued or transferred. Intermediaries anticipating
litigation, however, prefer that their acquisition of patents go unnoticed. This could be true for a
spectrum of reasons of varying legitimacy, ranging from a Lemelson-like desire to allow
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3. Patent Enforcement Intermediaries.—In a world of perfect markets,
the conditions described above would summon into existence intermediaries
specializing in the particular competencies that independent inventors are
likely to lack: the ability to enforce patents aggressively against incumbent
firms, the ability to raise funds to support the continuing development and
exploitation of the technology, and (most important from a social
perspective) the ability to facilitate the deployment of the technology by
licensing it to the firms best placed to use it. There can be no doubt that a
substantial group of these firms has arisen—some of the most prominent (in
alphabetical order) include Acacia Technologies Group, Altitude Capital,
Intellectual Ventures, and Rembrandt IP Management.136 Indeed, if there is
anything odd about the situation, it is not that some firms have arisen to fulfill those functions but that they have taken so long to appear. Because none
of the considerations discussed above explaining the rise of these intermediaries has changed substantially in the last decade, it is not easy to see why
they have arisen so rapidly in the last few years alone.137
The activities of those firms illustrate, however, that each of them is
pursuing a distinct strategy. The best way to understand those strategies is to
recognize that different inventors will fail in commercialization for different
reasons. Thus, the optimal exploitation strategies for different technologies
will be different, which makes it natural to expect that a range of intermediaries would arise specializing in different strategies. As illustrated in Figure
8, we organize those strategies along two different dimensions: the type of
opportunity that the intermediary acquires and the source of funds on which
the intermediary relies.
a. Acquiring Litigation or Technology?—The most fundamental
distinction relates to the type of asset on which the intermediary focuses.
Here, we discern a spectrum from pure litigation on one end (with relatively

competitors to become more dependent on a patent before revealing its existence to more pedestrian
concerns, such as a desire to control the forum in which litigation will occur. It is not entirely clear
what the best solution is, but it is worth noting that many large companies have their patents held by
a separate, nonpracticing company that has no assets other than intellectual property. See Brad
Stone, Factory of the Future?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at 60 (noting that Microsoft, Intel, Sony,
Nokia, and Apple have some of their patents held by a nonpracticing company called Intellectual
Ventures).
136. There are many smaller firms that exploit particular technologies. E-Pass Technologies,
for example, exists primarily to support the licensing of its patented smart-card product. See E-Pass
Technologies, Inc., Corporate Information, http://www.e-pass.com/corporateinfo.htm (“The
company is primarily organized to promote the sales and marketing of the e-pass smart card . . . .”).
137. The disparaging and poorly reasoned discussion in the concurring opinion of Justice
Kennedy in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842–43 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), certainly has contributed to the high visibility of the issue as a policy matter and the
simplistic pejorative use of the term “troll” to refer to the wide variety of entities discussed here.
Justice Kennedy made a passing reference to what he saw as the suspect quality of business-method
patents, supported only by a reference to an article making several arguments that business-method
patents were unconstitutional, arguments that were strange to say the least. Id.
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little regard for technology) to pure technology at the other end (with little
regard for litigation). Thus, at one end of the spectrum we would place firms
like Acacia, which function much like the paradigmatic securities class action law firm. Essentially, those firms search for opportunities to acquire
patents, frequently from defunct firms.138 With the patents in hand, they
search broadly for companies that might be regarded as infringing those
patents, often in market sectors far removed from the market at which the
patent originally was directed. Whenever they can present a colorable claim,
they should be able to obtain a settlement from the defendant that at least reflects the expected present value of the defendant’s litigation costs (what
some might deprecatingly call a “nuisance” settlement). That activity will be
privately profitable whenever those settlements exceed the often trivial cost
that the intermediary must pay to acquire the patents. The net social contribution of that activity would depend on the balance between the funds that
are flowing back to the original inventor (and thus providing an incentive for
the innovative activity that generated the patent), balanced against the
resources consumed in the litigation to enforce the patent.
Figure 9: Schema of Patent Exploitation Intermediaries

At the other end of the spectrum are firms focused more on the
acquisition of technology than on litigation. Here we place a firm like
Altitude Capital, a firm with a relatively large share of veterans of hedge
138. Acacia in particular has brought suits in several cases already relying on patents purchased
from insolvent entities. See Jeff Sandford, Stream Media Faces Lawsuit Test, WEB HOSTING
MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 13, 13–14 (discussing Acacia’s acquisition of five patents for streaming
media technologies and the company’s expectation of a large payoff from suits to defend those
patents). Because many of those entities are failed venture-backed start-ups, the activity affords a
link through which assets in failed venture capital start-ups can be brought into the independent
inventor channel. However, it is not clear that the availability of that channel is important to
investment decisions.
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funds and of investment banks.139 In general, the goal is to earn a profit by
skillful balancing of present and future cash flows related to the technology.
Thus, a typical transaction for Altitude would involve immediate payment to
the inventor in return for the present acquisition of a patent. Altitude would
hope to recoup the payment over time by revenues obtained from licensing
the patent to an incumbent with a use for the technology. For that transaction
to succeed, Altitude must accurately assess the value of the technology—the
likely future revenues that the patent will generate—and also must convert
those revenues to an anticipatory payment stream accruing to the inventor. If
it is skilled at both of those tasks, Altitude should be able to earn a good return on the funds that it invests. The social value of the activity, again,
would turn on the balance between the funds flowing back to the original
inventor and the transaction costs associated with Altitude’s activity. If
Altitude can succeed in generating sufficient revenue streams to earn a profit
while both avoiding litigation and returning a substantial stream of funds to
the original inventors, it is hard to quarrel with the model from a social perspective.
Somewhere in between are firms (like Rembrandt) that buy into existing
disputes and invest substantial resources to develop the dispute.140 The
emphasis is on patent disputes that are already mature, in the sense that the
technology already has been deployed in the market, so that the patents write
onto existing products. The core competency at which such a firm aims is an
ability to precisely estimate the likelihood that the patent will be held valid,
the likelihood that the defendant’s products will be found to infringe the
patent, and the likely amount of damages a court will award for the
infringement. Those firms closely resemble the litigation-financing firms
that have proliferated throughout the legal community in recent years,141 with
the addition of a particular expertise in patent litigation.
b. Funded by Financiers or Incumbents?—The discussion above
also suggests that the identity of the investor in the intermediary should have
structural significance. Most of the patent-exploitation intermediaries rely on
funds from external investors—pure financiers—with no particular role in
the industry, and no strategic goal other than a substantial return on their
investment.142 Indeed, some intermediaries explain that the detached view of
the financier is central to the success of their model because it allows them to

139. See Altitude Capital Partners, http://www.altitudecp.com/team.html (providing the
biographies of Altitude Capital employees).
140. See Brief of Rembrandt in eBay, supra note 126, at 1–2 (describing Rembrandt’s
activities).
141. E.g., Alison Frankel, Helping Underfunded Plaintiffs Lawyers—at a Price, LAW.COM,
Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1139565913200.
142. See Nathan Vardi, Patent Pirates, FORBES, May 7, 2007, at 44 (describing a private
investment firm’s investment in an exploitation intermediary solely for the purpose of receiving a
percentage of the winnings in a pending patent lawsuit).
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pursue patent enforcement and litigation in a clinical and perfectly rational
manner, unencumbered by the distractions of social or business relations that
would come with funds from an incumbent.143 This unclouded and calculating rationality that independence brings seems to be an important cultural
attribute of these firms—it came up in one way or another in all of our conversations with representatives of these firms.
But not all firms have that perspective. In particular, Nathan
Myhrvold’s Intellectual Ventures entities rely on funding from a large set of
the most important incumbents in the industry, with the conspicuous exception of IBM.144 Returning to the discussion above, it is easy to see what
Intellectual Ventures provides that the financier-funded intermediaries
cannot—the ability to use relational ties to overcome the information
paradox that makes it so difficult for independent inventors to obtain fair
value for their technology from large incumbent firms. Thus, it should be no
surprise to see that Intellectual Ventures appears to have been much more
successful than any of the other prominent intermediaries at negotiating license agreements with major incumbent firms.145
Looking at the “supply” side of the equation as well, it is easy to
understand why incumbents would so willingly invest in an intermediary
controlled by a person whom they know (like Myhrvold). If the incumbent
firms believe that they are wasting resources on litigation against “trolls”
because of legal rules that (in the view of incumbents) give trolls an unfair
return on their patents, the natural response of a rational incumbent would be
to invest in the “troll” directly, so that the incumbent could recover the
“unfair” returns that the troll earns in litigation against the incumbent.
Whether incumbents are correct in that assessment of the situation, it seems
fairly clear that it is the view of many of the incumbents, and something akin
to such a view has helped to drive the investments in Myhrvold’s enterprises.
In any event, the investments should be privately profitable if Myhrvold
can obtain license revenues from the incumbent firms that are adequate in
light of the funds he spends to acquire patents. From a social perspective,
assessing the value of the activity is similar to the assessment of the firms
discussed above. The question is whether the incentives arising from the
funds that flow to original inventors through Myhrvold’s patent acquisitions
exceed the drag on innovation reflected by the licensing fees that the incumbent firms pay. Given the relatively low transaction costs of the licensing, it

143. See Alan Cane, Trolls Control the Rickety-Rackety Bridge of Intellectual Property, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 20, 2006, at 2 (noting that exploitation intermediaries are free to seek
injunctions because they have no market share or business relations to lose).
144. Stone, supra note 135, at 60.
145. This discussion substantially oversimplifies the business model of Intellectual Ventures.
A large part of the acquisition strategy of Intellectual Ventures is wholly unrelated to any
reasonably foreseeable enforcement of the patents. Rather, it is designed to provide freedom to
innovate in areas in which Intellectual Ventures hopes to be filing its own patent applications based
on its own innovative activities. See id. (describing Intellectual Ventures’ business plan).
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is difficult to quarrel with the model from a social perspective (at least in the
absence of some problem with the quality of the patents that Myhrvold acquires and enforces).
V.

Conclusion

The puzzle that primarily motivates this Article is why the
pharmaceutical and manufacturing industries have monolithic perspectives
on patent policy while each firm in the software industry seems to have a different position on patent policy—a position that is likely to change from time
to time. The usual answer is that the low ability of patents to appropriate innovation in the industry makes the patents less useful and thus lowers the
social value of granting them.146 But that explanation would support a pattern of persistent ambivalence. What we see on the contrary is heated
disagreement and instability of perspective.
We think the history and data presented here provide a useful lens for
understanding the views on patent policy of those in the industry. For one
thing, the role of patents has changed dramatically from the mid-1960s to the
present. In the mid-1960s, patents only had value for firms hoping to challenge IBM’s dominance in the production of computers and software.147 By
the twenty-first century, in contrast, the industry has matured into a complex
pattern, with at least four distinct groups (incumbents, venture-backed firms,
open-source communities, and independent inventors and associated
intermediaries), each with a different relation to the patent system.
For many years, there was a debate over the fundamental question of
patentability, a debate that remains open in the European Union to this
day.148 In recent years, however, policy debates have shifted away from that
question to converge on the idea that the system is broken in ways that call
for changes in various details of patent policy.149 Thus, the main area in
which there is a realistic likelihood of attempted retrenchment on patentability in this country is in the area of business methods. Because of the
common confusion of technical software patents with software-implemented
business-method patents, this presents a potential problem for software firms.
The natural response by software firms may be to publicly differentiate the
two and distance themselves from the latter. IBM argued in Metabolite,150
for example, in favor of ratcheting up the “useful application” standard to
146. See Mann, supra note 62, at 978 (noting that a basic problem for software firms at all
stages is the sense that even with a patent it is often difficult for a firm to appropriate the value of its
invention).
147. See id. at 1005 (describing IBM’s historic market dominance).
148. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
149. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 87–94 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (arguing that
the obviousness test should be changed).
150. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per
curiam).
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require some “technological contribution,” which would bar the issuance of
business-method patents that are not implemented in software or some other
tangible product.151
Another important area likely to see reform is the topic of patent
quality. Much of the criticism of patents focuses on a small number of
highly visible and dubious patents. Academics for several years now have
been raising concerns about the quality of PTO patent review.152 Those concerns focus on the difficulties that the PTO has faced in identifying the
relevant prior art, especially in new technologies like software.153 The obvious policy response, if the details can be worked out, is some form of
“community patent review” in which firms in the area of a proposed patent
would have an opportunity to suggest relevant prior art before a patent is
issued.154 Similarly, on the PTO’s side, the persistent public complaints
about notoriously bad patents have resulted in a pointed emphasis on patent
151. Brief of International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 30, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607); see also Supplemental Letter Brief of
United States Patent and Trademark Office, In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286 (Fed. Cir. filed Jan. 30,
2006) (arguing that business methods are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). The patents
at issue in IBM v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 9:06 Civ. 242 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 23, 2006), and IBM v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 6:06 Civ. 452 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 23, 2006) appear to be precisely the kind
of “technical method” patents that would be upheld under the position IBM urged in Metabolite.
See FedCirc.us, Case Page for IBM v. Amazon, http://www.fedcirc.us/case-pages/ibm-v.amazon.html. To be sure, some believe that “business methods” defines such an imprecise category
that any effort to limit their patentability will be undermined by arbitrary line drawing and strategic
gamesmanship by applicants. See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of
Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 729, 758–89 (2006) (discussing the insurmountable difficulties encountered in defining a
“business method”); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with
Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 675–79 (2001)
(discussing proposed legislation that would have raised the bar for obtaining business-method
patents).
152. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206 (1998) (“[W]e cannot predict with confidence that
patents in general are more likely to be held valid than invalid.”); Bhaven N. Sampat, Determinants
of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf (finding that patent
examiners are less likely to discover nonpatent prior art and foreign patents).
153. Empirical evidence reveals, however, that problems with patent quality are not localized—
at least not in the case of software or software-implemented business methods. See, e.g., John R.
Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987,
1036–77 (finding that Internet-related business-method patents issued through December 31, 1999,
were not of lower quality and value than the average patent and patents in most other technology
areas); Allison & Mann, supra note 7 (manuscript at 20–41) (finding evidence in a data set of
20,000 computer-industry patents that software patents vary greatly in quality and value, but as a
whole appear to be of higher quality and value than nonsoftware patents issued to the same group of
firms and of higher quality and value than the general population of patents); Allison & Hunter,
supra note 151, at 789 (arguing that problems with patent quality are systemic rather than localized
and that reform efforts should focus on all subject matter areas); Allison et al., supra note 130, at
448–64 (finding that patents in all areas of technology in the general population of patents are of
apparently lower quality and value than those in all areas of technology that are litigated).
154. For details on the progress of that initiative, see The Peer to Patent Project: Community
Patent Review, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/.
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quality in the PTO’s proposed strategic plan for 2007–2012.155 The central
concern is that without serious review of patent applications it makes little
sense to continue to give patents the presumption of validity that traditionally
goes with issuance.
Even if those criticisms are anecdotal, most of the large patenting firms
agree that the PTO could do a better job of locating relevant prior art and
processing applications expeditiously.156 Thus, although those firms rely
heavily on patents, it makes sense for them to support changes that would
“raise the bar” of patentability. The support for “gold-plated patents”
suggests that those firms, for the most part, believe they would do just as
well under a system in which it was harder to obtain patents than it is now.157
Similarly, the positions taken in the KSR case suggest a general consensus, at
least among large firms, that the standard for obviousness should be changed
to make it easier for the PTO to reject patents.158
Because these kinds of reforms affect only firms that apply for patents
(or who compete in sectors with those who do), debate over them has been
relatively technical. That is not to say that the reforms affect all firms
equally. For example, proposals for community patent review promise more
benefits to large firms with substantial patenting infrastructures than they do
to smaller venture-backed start-ups. It is to say, however, that the various
initiatives have gotten more attention from the large incumbents than from
smaller firms.
The most prominent topic for debate has been the need for litigation
reform. Limitations on the availability of injunctive relief have appeared in
recent patent reform bills and were urged upon the Supreme Court in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. Compared to patent-quality issues, rules on
patent enforceability will affect different strategies in markedly different
ways. So, for example, in eBay representatives of the independent-inventor
community and other technology licensors like Qualcomm predictably
pressed for all but automatic injunctive relief.159 By contrast, representatives
155. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007–2012 STRATEGIC PLAN (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf.
156. See, e.g., John P. Mello Jr., Patent Office Says Critics Wrong, Complete Review Provided,
TECHNEWSWORLD, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/42207.html (reporting
criticism by IBM’s vice president for intellectual property that the PTO is unable to expeditiously
process applications or adequately review prior art).
157. The idea of gold-plated patents is that applicants who are willing to pay for a more
thorough prior art search and more rigorous examination should receive a stronger presumption of
validity for their patents than those who are not. Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad
Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10.
158. See, e.g., Brief of IBM in KSR, supra note 4, at 26–30 (proposing an alternative test for
nonobviousness that would allow the PTO to reject more patents).
159. See Brief Amici Curiae of Martin Cooper et al. in Support of Respondent at 2, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (“[T]he right of exclusivity means
nothing without injunctive relief.”); Brief for Technology Patents & Licensing Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (urging the Court not to
disturb “the general rule that, in the usual case, injunctive relief is appropriate where infringement
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of the open-source community and firms that are more likely to be defendants in patent litigation lined up to argue vigorously for limitations on
injunctive relief.160 Indeed, many of them argued for a categorical bar on
injunctive relief in favor of “nonpracticing entities,”161 a position received
sympathetically by some Justices.162
Many industries consolidate as they mature into a small group of
relatively homogeneous firms. If that ever happens in the software industry,
it will not happen soon. Business models in the software industry differ
starkly from firm to firm. The still increasing variety in the uses to which
software is put offers one reason. Another comes from the common tactic of
technology companies to leverage competencies at one part of the value
chain against commoditization at another—IBM supporting “free” software
that is compatible with its proprietary hardware, software, and service
offerings; Adobe supporting one free product that facilitates use of its higher
end proprietary products; even Microsoft supporting free small business
accounting software that should increase demand for its proprietary product
line.163 The variety of strategies, coupled with the relative difficulty of using
IP to appropriate innovation in software, underscores the importance of attention to context in designing IP rules for the industry. The fact that every
sector is offering views that support its own interests does not mean that
and validity of a patent have been proved”); Brief of Amici Curiae Qualcomm Incorporated and
Tessera, Inc. in Support of Respondent at 4, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“The current
patent injunction principles do not require any judicial adjustment.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondent at 3, eBay, 126
S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“Given the ease with which infringers can reverse engineer
pharmaceutical products . . . injunctive relief offers in many circumstances the only effective
protection.”); Brief of Rembrandt in eBay, supra note 126, at 1–3 (arguing that injunctive relief
should remain available to “non-practicing entities” that invest in patents but do not practice them);
Brief of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
8, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (arguing that the Court should not change the rule that “a
patentee’s non-use of an invention does not bar the issuance of a permanent injunction”); Brief of
United Inventors Association et al. in eBay, supra note 126, at 3 (“[T]his Court should reaffirm its
precedents rejecting compulsory licensing and excluding non-use as a factor in granting patent
injunctions.”).
160. See Brief of Business Software Alliance in eBay, supra note 4, at 3 (arguing that district
courts should apply traditional equitable factors in patent cases to determine whether injunctive
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policymakers should ignore those views; it means that they should be sure
that any reforms they adopt do not accidentally elevate the temporary
interests of firms using one strategy over those of firms using another.

